Inaccurate initial estimates of the flow of oil also undermined public confidence in the government's efforts to fight the spill, which in turn, prompted the Obama administration to deploy resources based on political considerations, the reports conclude.
The reports also say the White House withheld worst-case discharge figures from the public early on, sticking to an estimate from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration that 1,000 b/d to 5,000 b/d were gushing from the well when its own internal data showed the spill was much worse.
The White House vehemently denied the charge, issuing a statement from NOAA Administrator Jane Lubchenco and Office of Management and Budget Acting Director Jeffrey Zients.
"As for the predictions about the spill flow rate, senior government officials were clear with the public what the worst-case flow rate could be," the statement read. "In early May, Secretary Salazar and Admiral Thad Allen told the American people that the worst case scenario could be more than 100,000 barrels a day."
The four "staff working papers" were prepared by the staff of the commission appointed by President Barack Obama to investigate the causes of the BP Macondo blowout and recommend ways to better handle future spills. The reports are based on interviews, public testimony and news reports and are designed to suggest areas of further consideration and study.
The full commission is scheduled to meet next week in Washington for its first internal discussion of the testimony it has heard thus far; the commission is scheduled to report to Obama in January.
CONFUSION OVER WHO WAS IN CHARGE
In the first days after gas exploded on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, killing 11, it was hard to know who was in charge of the containment efforts, despite federal regulations that aimed to clearly delineate the roles in response to such a disaster, the reports say.
The Macondo spill was the first ever to be declared a "spill of national significance" -- a designation which triggered a national contingency plan that had never been used before and that state and local officials along the Gulf of Mexico were not familiar with.
The massive task of organizing a federal response to the disaster was complicated early on by confusion over the role that BP would play and an unjustified optimism that the spill would be resolved soon, the reports say.
"For the first 10 days of the spill, it appears that a sense of over-optimism affected responders," one of the reports said. "Responders almost uniformly noted that, while they understood they were facing a major spill, they believed that BP would get the well under control."
The report concludes that by May, federal responders had stepped up their efforts and were "fighting a war against the oil."
Still, as the size and scope of the spill became clearer, there was initial confusion over who was in charge of the response to control the leaking wellhead and clean the oil at the surface, the report found.
BP's total control over the spewing Macondo well in the immediate aftermath of the blowout limited access of government scientists, the staff reports said.
PERCEPTION GOVERNMENT WASN'T MOVING FAST ENOUGH
The response was further hindered by public perception that the federal government was not moving fast enough. That perception was fueled by state and local officials who chafed at the federal control that the national contingency plan granted and who protested that equipment such as skimmers and boom were not available in sufficient quality.
At the end of May, Obama tripled federal manpower and resources -- a move which may have actually hindered the real work of containing the spill, the report says.
"Tripling, of at least the arguable overreaction to the public perception of a slow response, resulted in resources being thrown at the spill in general rather than being targeted in an efficient way," the report states.
One of the four reports was particularly critical of the government's handling of the flow rate projections and the estimate of how much oil was left in the Gulf after the well was capped.
Coast Guard officials have said they responded from the beginning to a catastrophic spill and that initial projections of 1,000 b/d, which eventually were raised to as much as 62,200 b/d, did not hamper their response efforts.
But the shifting estimates hurt public trust, which had a direct impact on the effectiveness of federal efforts, the report concludes.
"The absence of trust fuels public fears, and those fears in turn can cause major harm, whether because the public loses confidence in the federal government's assurances that beaches or seafood are safe, or because the government's lack of credibility makes it harder to build relationships withstate and local officials, as well as community leaders, that are necessary for effective response actions," the report states.
The report suggested that steps be taken to more clearly define the roles played by industry and government in future spills. The two sides, while joined in a common goal of stopping the spill, may also have diverging motives.
"Given that it's potential liability under the Clean Water Act depended directly on the flow rate, BP had real incentive to maintain exclusive control over the ability to estimate that rate," the report states.
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