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Natural Gas exploration makes Indian Ocean entry

Natural Gas exploration makes Indian Ocean entry

Write: Marot [2011-05-20]
Major new energy issues are about to transform still further the strategic balance of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, with foreseeable consequences for the global energy market over the coming decade. Soon-to-be-evident new wealth in the Red Sea/Horn of Africa region will transform the intensity of conflict there, which in turn will affect not only the region, but the world s most important trading route: the Red Sea/Suez sea line of communication (SLOC).

Much of the anticipated change is developing around the flood of new discoveries and exploitation of natural gas fields in the Indian Ocean region, particularly extending through Ethiopia, Egypt, and other countries of the Red Sea region. Apart from the impending influx of new energy wealth into the region, facilitating new levels of confidence and capability in the security environment, the boom of the Gas Age also seems set to promise within a decade an oversupply of gas to the world market, almost certainly precipitating a collapse in price for gas and petroleum.

The strategic balance in the Horn of Africa, and reaching through the Red Sea to Egypt and the Mediterranean, is changing rapidly and in many respects is becoming more unstable as political, geopolitical, economic, and ideological issues begin to clash. The war over the reunification of Somalia, incorporating both the old Italian Somaliland (now Somalia) and the Republic of Somaliland, has now become indisputable, and nominally-moderate Egypt has come down firmly on the side of reunifying the area under the clear dominance of an Islamist-dominated but anomic essentially lawless Somalia.

Egypt with its unstable political transition underway at the same time as the discovery of increasing quantities of natural gas has been covertly supporting a wide range of radical actions along the Red Sea littoral and in the Horn with the sole goal of ensuring that Ethiopia does not use its traditional heartland strength to be able to revive its dominance of the Red Sea and the sea lane which links to Egypt s Suez Canal.

In the process, however, the Egyptian Government has given support to the same radical jihadist groups which fundamentally oppose Egyptian secular governance, which support Iranian expansion into the Red Sea/Africa framework, and which have transformed a strategically benign Ethiopia into one which must now accept confrontation with Egypt and its regional allies.

This situation has been compounded by the recent Islamist/pan-Somalist success in winning power in Somaliland, but of equal importance has been the first quiet stage of the transformation of Ethiopia into an energy exporting power. Ethiopia s natural gas reserves which the US Energy Information Agency (EIA) in 2009 rated as zero and in early 2010 at one-trillion cubic feet (TCF), now have been demonstrated to be significant, and gas exports will begin within five years.

Malaysian State-owned oil and gas company Petroliam Nasional Bhd (Petronas) has now proven as much as four TCF of gas in its reserves in the Ogaden basin region of Ethiopia. Petronas is one of about 85 companies which have oil and gas exploration licenses in Ethiopia, but the Malaysian company is the first to begin its production phase, which should see a gas treatment plant and a gas pipeline from the Ogaden to Djibouti (at a total cost of $1.9-billion) on-line within five years. Estimated Ethiopian gas reserves, as of 2010 (not proven reserves ), were reported at 12.46 TCF, but this figure was likely to be expanded frequently as new discoveries are reported.

Significantly, although the externally-supported and -armed Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) has continued to sustain sporadic armed contact with Ethiopian security forces into August 2010, the second week of August saw the senior ONLF leadership in Washington, DC, meeting secretly (under US sponsorship) with representatives of the Ethiopian Government. Just days before that, representatives of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) also met in Washington, DC, with senior Ethiopian Government officials. Both the OLF and the ONLF have been receiving extensive logistical support, weapons, training, and funding from Eritrea, supported directly or indirectly by both Egypt and Iran.

It is now apparent to both the ONLF and OLF that their foreign patrons have been waging a losing battle against the Ethiopian Government, and that, with the growing strength and wealth of the Ethiopian Government, now is the time to consider coming to terms with Addis Ababa.

Any thought that the pan-Somalists, who have recently scored a major success in winning the Presidency of the Republic of Somaliland, can effectively make headway in the ethnically-Somali Ogaden region of Ethiopia have been quashed by the effective military action by the Ethiopian Defense Force (EDF) in its combat contacts with the pan-Somalists. The EDF units involved were almost entirely ethnically Somali (officers and men), and yet acted decisively to quash the Somalian forces fighting them.

Fighting around July 12, 2010, in the el-Dibir area of the Somaliland-Ethiopian border was largely credited in the media with being an EDF attack on civilians, but in fact it involved a clash with Islamist forces that were routed by the EDF, which seized 120 of the Islamists trucks and took them to the Ethiopian city of Jijiga.

At the core of all of this has been the proxy war waged by Iranian-backed Islamists, supported by the secular governments of Eritrea and Egypt, to keep Ethiopia landlocked. When the Ethiopian Government, some two years ago, began having an inkling that it might soon be in the gas exporting business, it started negotiations to build a pipeline to the Somaliland port of Berbera.

When it became clear that the UDUB Government of Somaliland was not well-prepared to contest the Presidential elections which resulted in a pan-Somalist Islamist taking power in July 2010 Ethiopia was forced to turn back to Djibouti as the only available seaport for the export of Ethiopian gas.